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India – Linking #Aadhaar to mobile and bank accounts is illegal- your guide what to do if forced

Dr Anupam Saraf
Mobile linkage
Various telecom companies are citing TRAI and DOT notifications to force you to link Aadhaar to your mobile else face disconnection. While it is not amusing that the government believes that a SIM issued in someone’s name is used by the same person and terrorists and criminals do KYCwith their own documents or Aadhaar, here are just three ways that requiring an Aadhaar to obtain a SIM endangers India:
1. It enables terrorists, criminals and anti-national forces to obtain multiple SIMs through eKYC, claims of eKYC, or submitting Aadhaar cards of other persons and use them in turn to open bank accounts for money laundering and financing anti-national activities.
2. It facilitates obtaining all documents like passport, and drivers licenses by using the new SIM and the Aadhaar. It, therefore, destroys our ability to distinguish a citizen from an illegal immigrant. It is therefore like the disease AIDS for the country.
3. The SIM treated as a proof of identity of the user allows infiltration of the country, even its defence services, with terrorists and anti-nationals causing a national security threat.
Here are just three ways that requiring an Aadhaar to obtain a SIM endangers you:
1. Because Aadhaar and one time passcode (OTP) are treated as “second factor authentication”, SIMs issued with your Aadhaar will be the single point for fraudsters to hack your identity, commit crime and rob you of your property, dignity, liberty, equality and access to justice.
2. Bank accounts opened using your Aadhaar and SIM, as well as property transactions, registration of contracts will no longer be in your control or with your knowledge and traceability. Because the use of “your” SIM in these instances will leave little deniability, if you are accused of these acts, it will destroy your right to justice.
3. The SIMs issued using your Aadhaar allow anyone in possession of such SIMs to impersonate you in both your private and public life. Not only will you have no way to know of such misuse, but you even have no ability to prove and control the misuse.
Bank linkage
Most banks have gone on an overdrive of threatening to freeze existing bank accounts unless customers to link Aadhaar. They are also refusing to open new bank accounts without Aadhaar, citing GSR 538(E), the amendment to the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003)(PMLA), on June 1st 2017.
It is not amusing either that the government believes that Aadhaar identifies anyone at all, provides proof of the persons authorisation or consent to opening bank accounts or even to do bank transactions. Here are just three ways that linking an Aadhaar number to a bank account or carrying out bank transactions destroys India’s financial systems:
1. When pressured to link Aadhaar to bank accounts, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had maintained that the use of the Aadhaar number was in conflict with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), the Basel Standards for maintaining customer information and its own extant guidelines. The RBI also highlighted that at best the Aadhaar is a third party identification and such third party identification is not used in banking practices anywhere in the world. It had also highlighted that the use of eKYC destroys customer acquisition information and customer records. As such, Aadhaar enables millions of shell bank accounts to be opened.
2. Bank accounts opened with Aadhaar can be created and operated remotely and therefore create a framework for money laundering at a scale that is impossible with pre-Aadhaar KYC. In five years post Aadhaar KYC, bank accounts in India have doubled from 44 crore to 88 crore and deposits have also doubled from Rs66 lakh crore to Rs122 lakh crore suggesting shell accounts with black money being parked in them.
3. Aadhaar-enabled Payment Systems (AEPS) transfer money from Aadhaar to Aadhaar number and not bank accounts. Such money transfers do not leave money trail and therefore facilitate money laundering in ways that was not possible with National Electronics Funds Transfer System (NEFT) or Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS).
Here are just three ways that linking Aadhaar to your bank accounts endangers you:
1. Your bank account becomes Aadhaar enabled allowing AEPS to transfer money into or from your account as soon as you link it to Aadhaar. This means all money transfers through the AEPS to or from your bank account will be un-traceable and therefore, also irreversible.
2. Money transfers to your account can now be hijacked by a “phishing” account that links itself to your Aadhaar number to receive money meant for you. Such money transfers may become impossible to track and reverse, as they do not leave any money trail.
3. Crime committed using duplicate accounts opened with your Aadhaar number will point to you, not the fraudster. This will also leave you defenseless and deprive you of recourse to justice.
What can you do?
Neither the Aadhaar linkage to mobiles nor the linkage to bank accounts is legal. In fact, it even violates the orders of the Supreme Court and is counter to the Rule of Law. The coercion to link Aadhaar to mobile phones started because of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Department of Telecom (DoT) colluded to ignore the Court’s orders, the rule of law, and existing legislation to produce notifications that mislead, misquote and cause coercion.
The coercion to link bank accounts started because the Department of Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance issued an illegal notification ignoring the law, Court orders and the rule of law.
Here are two open letters. The first to the Chairman of TRAI and the second to the Secretary, Dept of Revenue, asking them to end the illegalities, restore respect of the Supreme Court and respect the Rule of Law. You too can endorse them and spread them by mailing/emailing them, or sharing them on social media till the respective government offices respect the orders of the Supreme Court. Together, let us restore the Rule of Law, the protection of our national security, financial integrity and respect for national interests.
(Dr Anupam Saraph is a renowned expert in governance of complex systems and advises governments and businesses across the world. He can be reached @anupamsaraph)
***********************************************************************************
October 2nd 2017 
Chairman,
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 
Mahanagar Doorsanchar Bhawan (next to Zakir Hussain College) 
Jawaharlal Nehru Marg (Old Minto Road) 
New Delhi: 110 002
[email protected] @rssharma3 @trai 
Dear Mr RS Sharma,
Subject: Contempt of Rule of Law and the orders of the Supreme Court of India
Mr. Sanjeev Banzal, Advisor(NSL) recommended, vide No 102-2/2015-NSL-II dated January 20th 2017, to the Secretary, Department of Telecommunications to use Aadhaar based eKYC to re-verify existing mobile subscribers. 
Mr. Prashant Verma, ADG (AS-II) of Ministry of Communications, Department of Telecommunications (Access Services Cell) has been instructing all unified licensees, unified access service licensees and cellular mobile service licensees vide File No. 800-26/2016-AS.IIdated 23.03.2017 to re-verify all existing mobile subscribers through Aadhaar based eKYC process. Mr. Verma uses the documentation by the order of two member bench of the Supreme Court in WP(C) 607/2016 dated 06.02.2017 of the position brought to its notice as a direction of the court. He also asks the licensees to destroy old customer acquisition forms after an Aadhaar “verification”.
Mr Sanjay Kapur had filed an IA on behalf of the TRAI (IA 22, 23 of 2015) on Oct 3rd 2015 with the prayer to modify its order of 11.08.2015 in WP 494 of 2012 to permit biometric eKYC for paperless activation of telephone connections/SIM cards as an alternative process to the existing process of verification of telecom subscribers, till the disposal of the present writ petition. Kindly note the following:
1. A five member bench headed by the then Chief Justice of India in its order dated Oct 15th 2015, turned down your prayer to allow linkage of Aadhaar numbers with SIM activation. The court reiterated all its previous orders. In particular we draw your attention that the court  stated that:
1. “After hearing the learned Attorney General for India and other learned senior counsels, we are of the view that in paragraph 3 of the Order dated 11.08.2015, if we add, apart from the other two Schemes, namely, P.D.S. Scheme and the L.P.G. Distribution Scheme, the Schemes like The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employement Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), National Social Assistance Programme (Old Age Pensions, Widow Pensions, Disability Pensions) Prime Minister’s Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) and Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) for the present, it would not dilute earlier order passed by this Court. Therefore, we now include the aforesaid Schemes apart from the other two Schemes that this Court has permitted in its earlier order dated 11.08.2015” 
2. “We impress upon the Union of India that it shall strictly follow all the earlier orders passed by this Court commencing from 23.09.2013
3. “We will also make it clear that the Aadhaar card Scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this Court one way or the other”
2. The three member bench of the Court had noted earlier in its order of August 11, 2015 that: “The learned Attorney General had stated that the respondent Union of India would ensure that Aadhaar cards would only be issued on a consensual basis after informing the public at large about the fact that the preparation of Aadhaar card involving the parting of biometric information of the individual, which shall however not be used for any purpose other than a social benefit schemes.”. It had therefore ordered that 
1. “The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme;
2. “The information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation. 
3. In its first order of September 23, 2013, the apex court had highlighted that “In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for not getting the Aadhaar card inspite of the fact that some authority had issued a circular making it mandatory”.
4. Furthermore, the use of Aadhaar for linking to other databases, retention, storage or publishing is not only prohibited but also a punishable offence under the The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016
It is evident that all communications of the TRAI/DOT to require linkage of Aadhaar are invalid and bad in law. Moreover, they are also in contempt of the Supreme Court and are showing complete disrespect for the Rule of Law. 
In light of these facts, and to ensure that you do not continue to commit contempt of the Supreme Court of India, disregard the Rule of Law and get embroiled in needless controversy and criminality that results from the use and linkage of Aadhaar with the issue and use of SIM and telephones, we require that you kindly issue an immediate and urgent notification and advertise widely highlighting these facts and that mobile and telephone companies can not and do not require or use Aadhaar numbers or Aadhaar information for any process.
Sincerely yours,
CC 
1. TRAI members and Advisors
2. Chief Justice of India, ℅ Chief Justice’s Conference Secretariat, Supreme Court of India, Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110 201 Email: [email protected]
***********************************************************************************
October 2nd 2017
Secretary,
Ministry of Finance,
128-A/North Block, 
New Delhi
Dear Dr Hasmukh Adhia,
Subject: Contempt of Rule of Law and the orders of the Supreme Court of India
Mandeep Kaur, Dy. Secretary of your department notified GSR 538(E), citing powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (h), clause (i), clause (j) and clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 73 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), on June 1st 2017.
We draw your attention to the following:
1. A five member bench headed by the then Chief Justice of India in its order dated Oct 15th 2015, had reiterated all its previous orders. In particular we draw your attention that the court  stated that:
1. “After hearing the learned Attorney General for India and other learned senior counsels, we are of the view that in paragraph 3 of the Order dated 11.08.2015, if we add, apart from the other two Schemes, namely, P.D.S. Scheme and the L.P.G. Distribution Scheme, the Schemes like The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), National Social Assistance Programme (Old Age Pensions, Widow Pensions, Disability Pensions) Prime Minister’s Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) and Employees’ Providend Fund Organisation (EPFO) for the present, it would not dilute earlier order passed by this Court. Therefore, we now include the aforesaid Schemes apart from the other two Schemes that this Court has permitted in its earlier order dated 11.08.2015” 
2. “We impress upon the Union of India that it shall strictly follow all the earlier orders passed by this Court commencing from 23.09.2013”
3. “We will also make it clear that the Aadhaar card Scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this Court one way or the other”
5. The three member bench of the court had noted earlier in its order of August 11, 2015 that: “The learned Attorney General had stated that the respondent Union of India would ensure that Aadhaar cards would only be issued on a consensual basis after informing the public at large about the fact that the preparation of Aadhaar card involving the parting of biometric information of the individual, which shall however not be used for any purpose other than a social benefit schemes.”. It had therefore ordered that 
1. “The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme;”
2. “The information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation. 
6. In its first order of September 23, 2013  court had highlighted that “In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for  not  getting the Aadhaar card inspite of the fact that some authority had  issued a circular making it mandatory”.
7. Under section 74 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003) every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.The rules have not been laid before the Parliament as required by parliamentary procedure
8. Furthermore while clause (h) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003)was omitted by s. 29 with effect from 15.2.2013 and clause (i), clause (j) and clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 73 does not allow for freezing of any  asset or making it inoperable.
9. Furthermore, the use of Aadhaar for linking to other databases, retention, storage or publishing is not only prohibited but also a punishable offence under the The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016
It is evident that the GSR 538(E) to require linkage of Aadhaar is invalid and bad in law. More over it is in contempt of the Supreme Court and a disrespect for the Rule of Law. The tactic to coerce people under an invalid legislation that is in contempt of court is undemocratic and deplorable at the very least.
In light of these facts, and to ensure that you do not continue to commit contempt of the Supreme Court of India, disregard the Rule of Law and get embroiled in needless controversy, money-laundering, and criminality that results from the use and linkage of Aadhaar with the opening of bank accounts and undertaking financial transactions, we require that you kindly issue an immediate and urgent notification and advertise widely highlighting these facts and that banks can not and do not require or use Aadhaar numbers or Aadhaar information for any process including KYC and payment transactions.
Sincerely yours,
CC 
1. Dr Urjit R Patel, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, 16th floor, Central Office Building, Shahid Bhagat Singh Marg, Mumbai – 400 001 [email protected][email protected] for similar action to notify banks to purge all Aadhaar usage
2. Chief Justice of India, ℅ Chief Justice’s Conference Secretariat, Supreme Court of India, Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110 201 Email: [email protected]

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#AadhaarMafia Delhi Cop threatens activist – If you don’t have aadhaar or address proof you should be surrounded and killed

‘जिसका आधार नंबर और एड्रेस नहीं है हम उसे कहीं भी ख़तम कर सकते हैं’
‘एक अभियान चल रहा है घेरो और मारो’
Sub Inspector threatens  activist   Shabnam Hashmi 
New Delhi –  Shabnam Hashmi who is  a  founder trustee  of Pehchan , which  runs a small centre in Jaitpur extension and teaches school drop outs every year, coaches them to appear for 10th and 12th from Jamia. It also runs sewing classes for women.
She  received a call from Director of Pehchan coaching centre at 8.59pm  today who e told her  that Haseen husband of one of the women (Mubina) , who had learnt stitching at our centre, got a call from a man who said that he was calling from the Lajpat Nagar police station and was a sub inspector. He threatened Haseen and called him to the police station regarding some complaint. She gave me SI’s name and number.
Usually when someone is called at night we do try and call up the police officer concerned, try and arrange a lawyer to go with whoever has been called to the police station.,’ shabnam hashmi said  and added m’I did the same. Unfortunately my telephone did not have a call recorder downloaded. The conversation which was full of abuses, using highly derogatory and uncivilized language could not be recorded. I cut the phone after 15 minutes or so and downloaded a call recorder quickly. In between the person who claimed to be the Sub Inspector Sandip Malik from Lajpat Nagar Police Station called 4 times but I didn’t pick up the phone till the recorder was downloaded.
 Shabnam Hashmi ahs audio recording  which is self explanatory.
The earlier conversation was a lot more threatening and abusive as compared to what has been recorded.  I was directly threatened that I will be killed in an encounter and that there is the new law according to which whoever doesn’t have an aadhaar and address proof should be surrounded and killed (‘एक अभियान चल रहा है घेरो और मारो’ ).
The man who claimed to be the sub inspector called from mobile no 7065824289.
The conversation and the Sub Inspectors’ threat raise serious questions which the Government of the day and the Police Commissioner must answer.
Accoridng to truecaller, the number belongs to one Ashish Kumar and has also been indicated as a police number.

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Stop #Aadhaar- What you can do

Sign Petition to Chief Justice of India 

https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Chife_Justice_of_India_Stop_Mandatory_Aadhaar_for_services/share/?new

We the undersigned  request  Chief Justice of India  to stop the Government of India to continue committing contempt of court by implementing Aadhaar in each and every way , that it is doing inspite of Supreme Court’s order in the matter.  Aadhaar is  cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by the apex court one way or the other We request you to urgently hear the pending Aadhaar PILS

Draft letter you can send to your MP to request they take up amending Aadhaar Rules which are in parliament (drafted by Saurabh Bhatt)

Dear Sir/Madam,

Subject: Mandatory Use of UID-Aadhaar in Violation of Orders of the Supreme Court and Lacunae

in Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016

We write to about the Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016 [hereinafter, Aadhaar

Regulations] that have currently been laid before each House of Parliament in pursuance of Section 55

of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016

(hereinafter the Aadhaar Act), and seek to draw your attention to the lack of substantive and procedural

safeguards against exclusion of citizens through the use of Aadhaar.

At the outset, we express our profound sense of alarm at the manner in which Aadhaar has been made

mandatory, in clear disregard of Orders of the Supreme Court, for access to various entitlements,

subsidies, services, legal compliance, etc. We are constrained to point out that the Supreme Court has

repeatedly emphasised that the Aadhaar number “is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory

till the matter is finally decided by the Court one way or the other“. It must also be noted that the

Supreme Court has, through its order dated 14-09-2016, persisted with the prohibition on the

mandatory use of Aadhaar even after the passage of the Aadhaar Act. As such, insistence of mandatory

submission of Aadhaar Number for an ever-expanding list of services and activities constitutes an

unconscionable breach of the rule of law as well as contempt of the Supreme Court of India.

Even as such mandatory use of Aadhaar constitutes a violation of Supreme Court order, it also reinforces

the need for a robust, accessible, and accountable procedural mechanism for preventing misuse of

Aadhaar number and protecting citizens from denial of services due to linkage with Aadhaar. However,

the procedures envisaged by the Aadhaar Regulations fail to conform to elementary principle of fairness,

access and natural justices that have been recognized as integral part of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We

draw your attention to the following aspects in particular:

Deactivation without pre-decisional hearing

Regulations 29 to 32 of the Aadhaar Regulations provide for deactivation of Aadhaar number. In view

of the linkage between Aadhaar number and basic services, including basic services recognised as part

of the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution, strict procedures with rigorous safeguard

constitute an imperative. Yet, Regulation 29 fails to provide for pre-decisional hearing to the number-
holder as a compulsory requirement. The Regulation uses the phrase “deactivation may require field

inquiry”, suggesting that UIDAI has the discretion to dispense with an inquiry.

Further, clause (2) of the Regulation suggests that UIDAI may ask another agency to carry out the inquiry

and submit a report. The regulation however makes no mention of the selection process of this agency,

the qualifications of the persons carrying out such inquiry or the procedure the agency must follow.

Another cause of concern is that clause (3) of Regulation also fails to provide any guidance on the

officers within the UIDAI that would be authorised to carry out such deactivation or what procedure

they would follow prior to deactivating the Aadhaar number.

Inadequacy of Grievance Redressal

Regulation 30 of the Aadhaar Regulations require an aggrieved number-holder to pursue a complaint

through the “grievance redressal mechanism” set up under Regulation 32. Regulation 32 states that the

UIDAI “shall set up a contact centre to act as a central point of contact for resolution of queries and

grievances of residents, accessible to residents through toll free number(s) and/ or e-mail.”

However, the Regulations contain no indication about the powers of the contact centre or the

procedures it shall follow. In view of the critical impact of any deactivation of Aadhaar number and

consequent denial of services, grievance redressal mechanism must be prompt, effective and accessible.

But in the absence of both substantive and procedural norms, the mechanism envisaged under

Regulation 32 is in danger of being nothing more than a charade.

Further, the mechanism also fails the principle of access given its reliance on phones and emails. Such

a mechanism would serve to exclude those without phones or internets who even at this moment,

constitute a sizable section of our citizenry. Admittedly, clause (3) of Regulation 32 allows residents to

“raise grievances by visiting the regional offices of the Authority or through any other officers or

channels as may be specified by the Authority.” But with regional offices currently existing in mere 8

states, this option may also prove to be an illusory rope.

Levying and collecting Fees

The Aadhar (Enrolment and Update) (First Amendment) Regulations 2017 have authorised Registrars,

Enrolling Agencies and other Service Providers to collect a fee from the residents for the services

provided by them. Imposition of fees would constitute a dual burden on citizens and residents. Not only

are people being compelled to sign up for Aadhaar, they shall also be charged a fee for such enrolment.

Indeed, it seems a cruel joke being played at the cost of people of India.

In view of these lacunae, we believe that Aadhaar Regulations fail to act as a strong bulwark against

exclusion of people due to linkage of Aadhaar and other services. Therefore, we write to you and call

upon you to exercise your responsibility as Members of Parliament and request you to endeavour to

modify or annul the Aadhaar Regulations under Section 55 of the Aadhaar Act before the Regulations

become final.

Thanking you

Yours sincerely,

 

Serve contempt notice if forced to give aadhaar (drafted by Anupam Saraph)

Please ask others who face the same scene as you to complain. Do please tweet your complaints with #UIDContempt.
Here is a draft notice of contempt along with copies of the relevant orders of the Supreme Court that should be served to each agency in contempt of the orders of the Supreme Court after editing as required.
Name/Address of concerned authority that is forcing for an Aadhaar number
Dear Sir/Madam,
Subject: Contempt of Rule of Law and the orders of the Supreme Court of India
We are shocked that you have been continuing to require and use the UID number and associated data for purposes beyond that approved by the Supreme Court of India. We are also disturbed that you are mandating the requirement of the UID number. This is an unbelievable disrespect of the rule of law and of the repeated orders of the Supreme Court of India. 
Your actions have also resulted in coercing children, elderly and others alike to have to register for an UID number against their free will. Your actions also constitute an illegal functional creep that cannot be morally or legally justified. Your actions reek of creating a fait accompli before the court finally decides on the matter and hence does not uphold the promise of justice, liberty, equality or fraternity.
We draw your attention to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders of 11 August 2015 restricting the use of Aadhaar to PDS Scheme, for the distribution of foodgrains, and cooking fuel, such as kerosene and LPG. This was extended to allow its use for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), National Social Assistance Programme (Old Age Pensions, Widow Pensions, Disability Pensions) Prime Minister’s Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) and Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) in its orders of 15 October 2015. The Court also stated that the information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other purpose. The use of the UID number/ Aadhaar or information associated with it for any purposes other than that allowed by the court as well as it being mandated for any purposes not allowed by the court is a contempt of the rule of law and the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 
We also draw your attention to the orders of 15 October 2015 where the Court reiterated that the UID number/Aadhaar card Scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory for the permitted uses till the matter is finally decided by this Court one way or the other. 
We require that you immediately cease to require the UID number as your usage does not fall into the allowed uses of the UID/ We require you to end the mandatory requirement for the UID number and make the procedures for those with or without the UID number identical.
We trust you will share your compliance of the orders within 7 days, publish widely your decision to abide by the orders of the Supreme Court and not cause us to seek other remedies and relief for your failure to respect the rule of law. 
Sincerely yours,
CC 
1. Shri Nripendra Mishra, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, 152, South Block, Raisina Hill, New Delhi-110011
2. Prime Minister of India, 152, South Block, Raisina Hill, New Delhi-110011 Email: [email protected] Twitter: @narendramodi @pmoindia
3. President of India, Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi – 110 004 email: [email protected] 
4. Chief Justice of India, ℅ Chief Justice’s Conference Secretariat, Supreme Court of India, Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110 201

 

DO MENTION IN COMMENTS IF YOU HAVE ACTED ON NAY OF THE ABOVE ACTIONS 

Related posts

Are you being forced to have #Aadhaar #UID ? – Complain SC

 

PLEASE DO SEND COPY OF YOUR COMPLAINTS TO [email protected]

FACE BOOK GROUP SAY NO TO UID

 

 

 

childuid

Aadhaar (alias UID – unique identity number), is not to be made mandatory for any government service according to repeated Supreme Court orders in September 2013, March 2014 and the latest on 16th March 2015. Recently in the apex court, the judge further reprimanded the central government, “It is your duty to ensure our orders are followed. You can’t say states are not following our order.”

If there are cases of anyone being denied an entitlement or government service because they don’t have aadhaar, please send a letter to the Supreme Court at their official postal address, fax
The Registrar,
Supreme Court of India,
Tilak Marg,
New Delhi-110 201 (India)
PABX NOS.23388922-24,23388942-44,
FAX NOS.23381508,23381584,23384336/23384533/23384447
and email: [email protected] (
At the head of the message, it would be wise to mention, “For the kind attention of Hon’ble Mr Justice Chelameswar and companion judges hearing the matter regarding Aadhaar, in the matter of Aruna Roy v. Union of India Writ Petition (Civil) No. 833 of 2013″.
 I will request all of you to also write  complaints in the comments section of the blog post to keep a record of the complaints 
you can also end your complaint to me at- PLEASE DO SEND COPY OF YOUR COMPLAINTS TO [email protected], after you  send your complaint to Supreme Court
you can also post on FB GROUP – SAY NO TO UID
https://www.facebook.com/groups/nouid/?fref=ts

Related posts

Legal expert speaks out against biometrics #UID

ALOYSIUS XAVIER LOPEZ

Usha Ramanathan, an expert on law and poverty with students at the Asian College of Journalism in Chennai on Thursday. Photo: K. V. Srinivasan

The HinduUsha Ramanathan, an expert on law and poverty with students at the Asian College of Journalism in Chennai on Thursday. Photo: K. V. Srinivasan

“In India, we have no idea if biometrics will work or not”

Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) should be wound up as biometrics has failed miserably in many parts of the country, said eminent legal expert Usha Ramanathan.

Delivering a lecture on ‘Interrogating the UID and the National Population Register,’ Ms. Ramanathan, who has been monitoring and engaging with the UID project, said: “In India, we have no idea if biometrics will work or not.”

“Two to five per cent of people do not have fingerprints that work,” she said, pointing to the study using biometric technology which was tested on 25,000 people by the Biometrics Standards Committee before commencement of the project in 2009.

“It is an anti-people project. I am not willing to have a technology god to oversee me. Companies handling biometric data also have close links with intelligence agencies,” said Ms. Ramanathan.

Following the memorandum of understanding between the Registrar General of India and UIDAI, the National Population Register is breaking the rule in collecting biometrics, she added.

“There is simply too much we do not know. The National Population Register is actually acting illegally. The executive has systematically ignored the order of the Supreme Court. Yet there is hardly any questioning and reporting in the media.”

She stressed the need for learning the principles of civil disobedience when the State sees itself above the law. “There has never been an audit of the system. We need to destroy the system.”

“It is not a unique identity project. It is a unique identification project. It is about helping agencies identify us,” she said.

Chairing the talk and moderating the discussion, eminent lawyer Geeta Ramaseshan, clarified why we need to be wary of the hidden agenda in official schemes for creating a citizens’ roster through invasive data harvesting.

Read mor ehere- http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/usha-ramanathan-speaks-out-against-biometrics/article6292695.ece

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92 schools upload fake UID of students #WTFnews

92 aided schools under a cloud

THIRUVANANTHAPURAM: At least 92 aided schools across the state are suspected to have uploaded fake unique identification number of students to either retain the number of teacher posts they already have or increase the posts on the basis of student strength.Based on tip-offs about the tweaking of unique identification (UID) data, the general education department on Friday suspended 25 teachers of Kattachalkuzhi SN upper primary school under Balaramapuram educational sub-district here.

Though the school authorities had claimed student strength of 839, a detailed verification of the UID details furnished by the school to education department proved that a major chunk of them belonged to those aged above 17. Officials could find only 131 schools at the visit during their visit.

The department had completed staff fixation based on the UID data of students, undertaken for the first time this academic year, by July 15. Sources said the department noticed the inflated figures of student strength in some aided schools when some school managers tried to cross-check with officials if they could also add unique identification of outsiders to maintain the required student strength.

“Preliminary reports show that at least 92 aided schools in the state have uploaded fake UIDs on the department website to mislead officials about the actual number of students. We have sought the services of the State IT Mission to cross-check the veracity of UID data furnished,” general education secretary A Shajahan said.

He said the department had instructed school headmistresses to upload the students’ UID details and the task was completed by the headmistress and other teachers. “The misinformation on UIDs amount to a criminal offence of cheating. The government will take exemplary action against all those involved.”

However, there is no provision to take action against school managers as the responsibility of furnishing the details now rests on the headmistress and teachers.

According to Kerala education rules, the number of students in each class can vary from 1 to 50. The government had set the minimum strength of students at 25 in view of the fall in enrolment of students, and recently brought it further down to 15. However, the government has clarified that no government or aided school would be closed down even if there is only one student.

Statistics with the state health department show a dip in childbirths in the state every year. The general education department data put the number of school students at 39.5 lakh in 2010-’11. The number came down to 35.5 lakh in 2014-’15, when the number was estimated as per the UID details.

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Arun Jaitley – My Call Detail Records and A Citizen’s Right to Privacy #Aadhaar #Uid

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By  Arun Jaitley

In the past few months I have been closely monitoring a series of news reports which deal with surveillance of my mobile phones. An effort has been made to get access to my call detail records. On two occasions senior officers of the Delhi Police have met me to keep me informed of the progress of the case.

The Facts

On three occasions the Delhi Police has officially asked for the call detail records of the mobile phone which I regularly use. These details have been asked for by the South District, the Central District and the Crime Branch of Delhi Police. The reason for officially seeking the call detail records are both curious and ridiculous. On two occasions for two different periods the Call Detail Records were sought ostensibly on the ground that they were required for a verification in relation to the crime of multiple murders which had been committed in a farmhouse in Delhi. On the third occasion a Head Constable of Delhi Police sought the details and successfully obtained them on the ground that he was returning from the Saket Courts, an anonymous source advised him to check up the call detail records of my telephone number since the same may provide some evidence in relation to a fake currency racket. Obviously, both the pretexts were palpably false. Even for the wildest of imagination there would not be any evidence available in my phone details in relation to these offences. I hardly have any familiarity with the persons involved in these crimes or in relation to the subject matter of the offence.

In another incident the Delhi Police unearthed an effort to a constable of the Police acting at the behest of a private detective agency to get the Call Detail Records of some of the phones which are used by persons around me. Two phones in my name are used by two drivers whom I alternatively use and the third one is used by my son. When I am in my car or at a meeting, I do receive calls on my driver’s numbers. The Delhi Police claims that this attempt was foiled by a vigilant employee of the Service Provider who suspected foul play in these transactions.

The details of these calls being observed through official and illegal channels were for the periods November-December,2012 and January 2013. It was junior officers of the police including the officials at the level of Head Constable and Constables who could get access to these Call Detail Records.

It is obvious that somebody during this period was desperately trying to look for some evidence in my call details. The combined effort has covered the phones which I regularly use and some phones of persons who accompany me which I may incidentally use. Regrettably the Delhi Police believes that each of these efforts are unconnected and there is no pattern in the fact that an attempt was being made both successfully and unsuccessfully to monitor the persons with whom I am in touch with during the critical period. I find it difficult to accept this explanation of the Delhi Police that it is unable to find out the master-mind behind this operation and it is merely co-incidental that so many activities were taking place at the same time to get at my Call details.

The Delhi Police would have me believe that these were unconnected developments. The inability of the Delhi Police to find out the master-mind behind this operation does not mean that there is no master-mind. Either the investigation is extremely incompetent to discover the identity of the master-mind or the Delhi Police finds it embarrassing to name the master-mind. My guess is still wide open. This could be an out-sourced operation to a Government agency or a private rogue operation.

The Effect

My object in raising this issue is not to play a victimhood card. I raise this issue because some larger questions of public interest are involved.

Firstly, every citizen in India has a right to privacy. His right to pirivacy is an inherent aspect of his personal liberty. Interference in the right to privacy is an interference in his personal liberty by a process which is not fair, just or reasonable. A person’s Call Detail Records can throw up details of several transactions. In the case of an average citizen it can reflect on his relationships. In the case of a professional or a business person it can reflect on his financial transactions. In the case of a journalist it can reveal the identity of his sources. In the case of a politician it can reveal the identity of the person with whom he has regular access. Every person has ‘a right to be left alone’. In a liberal society there is no place for those who peep into the private affairs of individuals. No one has a right to know who another communicates with him. The nature of communication, the identity of persons being communicated with and frequency of communications would be a serious breach of privacy. If Constables and Head Constables of police officially (even though on false pretexts ) or unofficially can get access to Call Detail Records of an individual (in this case Leader of Opposition in one of the Houses of Parliament) the personal liberty of an individual would be in peril.

In the case of a Member of Parliament, this raises an additional issue. A Member of Parliament like a media person receives information from various sources. It is in public interest that the identity of the sources is to be concealed. Most scams are exposed by insiders. If identity of sources are revealed there is a danger of the sources drying up and public interest suffering. A Member of Parliament has several undefined privileges. Nobody has a right to know who communicates with him. If those who communicate with him are exposed nobody would be willing to provide information to a Member of Parliament. This will be detrimental to public interest. If the privileged phone records of the Leader of Opposition can be accessed so easily, one shudders to think as to what would happen to an ordinary citizen.

This incident throws up another legitimate fear. We are now entering the era of the Adhaar number. The Government has recently made the existence of the Adhaar number as a condition precedent for undertaking several activities; from registering marriages to execution of property documents. Will those who encroach upon the affairs of others be able to get access to bank accounts and other important details by breaking into the system? If this ever becomes possible the consequences would be far messier.
Read morehere- http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8683:article-shri-arun-jaitley-on-qmy-call-detail-records-and-a-citizens-right-to-privacyq&catid=68:press-releases&Itemid=494

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Supreme Court Must Immediately Declare Aadhaar As Unconstitutional #UID

aadhaar

 

Praveen Dalal

Any Government holds the Public Resources in a “Fiduciary Capacity” as a Trustee for the future generation. This is the gist of the Public Trust Doctrine that is frequently applied by Courts around the World while dealing with Environment and natural resources related issues. Can this Doctrine be applied to “Public Money”? I believe it should be made applicable to the hard earned Public Money as well that is given to our Government in the form of various Taxes.

Can Politicians misappropriate Public Money through corrupt means and deposit the same in foreign banks out of the reach of Indian Government? Can Indian Capital be kept out of the reach of Indian Government so that it is not used for Development and Reforms in India? Can Indian Government spend enormous financial resources upon Projects that have no Parliamentary Oversight and are actually violating the protections conferred by the Indian Constitutions?

We all know that the answers to these questions cannot be anything except No. Still all of these Evils and Corrupt Practices are happening in India. When the latest BJP led Government was formed, the Supreme Court of India directed it to Constitute and Notify a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to probe Black Money deposited in Foreign Jurisdictions. The same we promptly done by the Narendra Modi led Government and I really appreciate this “Alacrity and Commitment” of Modi. Now the SIT has been constituted and it has already started functioning.

On the one hand India has recovered $310 million from Finmeccanica helicopter deal while on the other hand a sum of Rs 2,039 crore has been granted in the budget for the Aadhaar Project. India terminated the helicopter deal in January 2014 citing a breach of integrity after allegations of bribery emerged in Italy against executives at Finmeccanica’s helicopter unit. Surprisingly, the Modi Government did not find anything wrong with the Aadhaar Project that has already consumed thousand of Crore of hard earned Public Money without any Parliamentary Oversight, Transparency, and Accountability.

Those who have wasted Crore of hard earned Public Money upon the Illegal and Unconstitutional Aadhaar project must be made answerable to Indian Courts as soon as possible instead of granting further funds to the Aadhaar. This is giving a “Negative Signal” that “Constitutional Norms” are just Paper Words and the Powerful are simply beyond the reach of “Rule of Law”. This is also giving an indication that Politicians are beyond the Scrutiny and Reach of Indian Courts. This is a “Dangerous Trend” that has to be stopped immediately by the Supreme Court of India.

The only solaced for the Modi Government is a promise to formulate Legal Framework for the Aadhaar Project. However, this promise must not face the similar fate as witnessed during the Congress led Government. Even if the Modi Government succeeds in formulating a Law for Aadhaar Project, the same must be Just, Fair and Reasonable. It should not be of the type suggested by the Congress Government as that would not pass the “Test of Constitutionally” before the Supreme Court of India.

The Aadhaar Project is suffering from many “Vices and Illegalities”. These include Civil Liberties ViolationsUnconstitutional E-Surveillance IssuesData security and Cyber Security Issues, Compulsory Nature of Aadhaar, Unaccountable Intelligence Agencies,Foreign E-Surveillance ThreatsTelecom Security IssuesIntegration with Surveillance projects like NATGRIDUnconstitutional Biometrics Collections, etc. All these aspects make the Aadhaar Project an Unconstitutional Project that was required to be Scrappedby the Modi Government.

The Illegality of Aadhaar Project has already been Challenged before the Indian Courts. The Supreme Court of India has even held that the Aadhaar Number/Card cannot be made Compulsory for availing Public Services in India. The Supreme Court has alsoprohibited UIDAI from sharing Biometric Data with Indian Government Agencies without Data Owner’s Consent. This may have prompted the Modi Government to suggest Legislation for Aadhaar.

Among all this Chaos and Illegalities one this is very clear. The current allocation of Public Funds to Aadhaar Project by the Modi Government has been done at a time when there is neither a Parliamentary Oversight nor any Techno Legal Measures to protect Civil Liberties of Indians. Of course, this is a mere allocation at this time and it would be a totally different story if no fund is utilised till the “Constitutional Roadblocks” are removed by the Modi Government. Till that time the funds must be kept intact.

As per media reports, the UIDAI is planning to spend precious 30 Crore of hard earned Public Money on “Convincing Indians” that Aadhaar is a “Welfare Scheme Project”. This is absurd to even suggest much less accepted as Aadhaar has no “Welfare Elements” attached to it whatsoever. From its present form one can easily deduce that Aadhaar Project is a Draconian E-Surveillance Project that has been launched along with other E-Surveillance Projects like Central Monitoring System (CMS), Internet Spy System Network and Traffic Analysis System (NETRA), etc. The fact is that Indian Government, Aadhaar Project and UIDAI are hiding truth from Indians.

Obviously, the Modi Government would approach the Supreme Court of India to make the Aadhaar Number/Card Compulsory for availing Government Services in India. The scenario has already changed in India as Government Departments are insisting upon use of Aadhaar as the “Exclusive Identity” for availing various Schemes and Services from them. They are making Aadhaar Mandatory despite the “Clear Directions” of Supreme Court. This is not only violation of various statutory provisions but is also a “Contempt of Court” as the Supreme Court’s order is binding upon all Government Authorities.

No Government Agency, Authority or Department can dare to flout Supreme Court’s order unless it has backing of Indian Government either directly or indirectly. If Government Departments and Authorities are insisting upon Aadhaar despite Supreme Court orders and the Indian Government is not taking any “Strict Action” against such Government Departments and Authorities, this is a clear indication that the Modi Government is not interested in following the orders of Indian Supreme Court regarding Aadhaar Project.

It is high time for Indian Supreme Court to declare the Aadhaar Project Unconstitutional and scrap the same till it is in conformity with “Constitutional Norms”. It is equally imperative for the Modi Government to not waste even a single Rupee upon Aadhaar till it is clear of various “Infirmities and Illegalities”.

 

Read more here- http://ptlb.in/clpic/?p=351

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#India – Infringing Privacy for the Other 5 Billion #Aadhaar #UID

An Indian villager looks at an Iris scan

Move over, mobile phones. There’s a new technological fix for poverty: biometric identification. Speaking at the World Bank on April 24, Nandan Nilekani, director of India’s universal identification scheme, promised that the project will be “transformational.” It “uses the most sophisticated technology … to solve the most basic of development challenges.” The massive ambition, known as Aadhaar, aims to capture fingerprints, photographs, and iris scans of 1.2 billion residents, with the assumption that a national identification program will be a key ingredient to “empower poor and underprivileged residents.” The World Bank’s president, Jim Yong Kim, effusively summed up the promise as “just stunning.”

Although few can match Nilekani’s grand scale, Aadhaar is but one example of the development sector’s growing fascination with technologies for registering, identifying, and monitoring citizens. Systems that would be controversial—if not outright rejected—in the West because of the threat they pose to civil liberties are being implemented in many developing countries, often with the support of Western donors. The twin goals of development and security are being used to justify a bewildering array of initiatives, including British-funded biometric voting technology in Sierra Leone, U.N. surveillance drones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and biometric border controls in Ghana supported by the World Bank.

This vigorous adoption of technologies for collecting, processing, tracking, profiling, and managing personal data—in short, surveillance technologies—risks centralizing an increasing amount of power in the hands of government authorities, often in places where democratic safeguards and civil society watchdogs are limited. While these initiatives may be justified in certain cases, rarely are they subject to a rigorous assessment of their effects on civil liberties or political dissent. On the contrary, they often seek to exploit the lack of scrutiny: Nilekani recommended in another recent speech that biometric proponents work “quickly and quietly” before opposition can form. The sensitivity of the information gathered in aid programs is not lost on intelligence agencies: Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Mark Mazzetti recently revealed that the Pentagon funded a food aid program in Somalia for the express purpose of gathering details on the local population. Even legitimate aid programs now maintain massive databases of personal information, from household names and locations to biometric information.

Humanitarian organizations, development funders, and governments have a responsibility to critically assess these new forms of surveillance, consult widely, and implement safeguards such as data protection, judicial oversight, and the highest levels of security. In much of the world, these sorts of precautions are sorely lacking: For example, despite the success of information technology in Africa, only 10 countries on the continent have some form of data protection law on the books (and even those rarely have the capacity or will to enforce them).

Kenya is a good example of how these programs can go wrong. In the country’s recent election, a costly biometric voting scheme flopped, adding widespread uncertainty to an already fragile situation. The problems were manifold, from biometric scanners that couldn’t recognize thumbprints to batteries that failed and servers that crashed. As journalist Michela Wrong put it, “almost none of it worked.” With limited resources, why support expensive and often ineffective technologies like biometric voting when traditional systems often suffice? While biometrics could help clean up electoral rolls, they may very well serve to obfuscate the electoral process, as information is passed through proprietary applications and technologies, closed to public scrutiny and audit.

But the worries in Kenya extend beyond technological failure. Like many low-income countries, Kenya has historically lacked a robust program of birth registration, making public health work notoriously difficult. It also stymies the provision of education services and cash transfers to vulnerable populations. To rectify this, the Kenyan state has sought to enroll all adults in a biometric national identification scheme that aims to interoperate with various other databases, including the tax authority, financial institutions, and social security programs. According to the director of this Integrated Population Registration System, George Anyango, the government now has “the 360 degree view of any citizen above the age of 18 years.” The Orwellian language is particularly worrisome given Kenya’s lack of data protection requirements and history of political factionalism, including the ethnic violence in the aftermath of the 2007 election that resulted in the death of more than 1,000 Kenyans.

The Aadhaar project in India—a country with a history of ethnic unrest and social segregation, widespread political and bureaucratic corruption, and with no effective legislative protection of privacy—should raise similar, magnified fears. Furthermore, it’s doubtful the program could help bring about the social equality it promises. Proponents of these state registration schemes argue that a lack of ID is a key reason why the poor remain marginalized, but they risk misdiagnosing the symptom for the cause. The poor are marginalized not simply because they lack an ID, but rather because of a complex history of discriminatory political, economic, and social structures. In some cases a biometric identity scheme may alter those, but only if coupled with broader, more difficult reforms.

One of Aadhaar’s biggest promises is the opportunity to open bank accounts (which require identification). Yet, poor, marginalized Indians, even with an ID, find formal banks to be unfriendly and difficult to join. For example, the anthropologist Ursula Rao found that the homeless in India—even after registering for Aadhaar—were blocked from banking, most frequently for lack of proper addresses, but more fundamentally because, as she notes, biometric identification “cannot establish trust, teach the logic of banking, or provide incentives for investing in the formal economy.” Bank managers remain suspicious and exclusionary, even if an identity project is inclusive. Without broader reforms—including rules for who may or may not access identity details—novel identification infrastructures will become tools of age-old discrimination.

Another, more practical drawback is that biometric technology is particularly ill-suited for individuals who have spent years in manual labor, working in tough conditions where their fingerprints wear down or they may even lose full fingers or limbs. Even with small authentication error rates—say, the 1.7 percent that recent estimates from Aadhaar suggest—the number of failures in a population the size of India’s can be enormous. Aadhaar has already enrolled 240 million people, with plans to reach all residents. You do the math.

The growth of these systems is due in part to the lack of public education and consultation, as well as the paucity of technical expertise to advise on the risks and pitfalls of surveillance technologies. But certainly the international donors and humanitarian organizations that support these initiatives have a responsibility to critically assess and build in safeguards for these technologies. Given the enormity of the challenge facing these organizations, it is perhaps easy not to prioritize issues like privacy and security of personal data, but the same arguments were once made against gender considerations and environmental protections in development. Aid programs that involve databases of personal information—especially of those most vulnerable and marginalized—must adopt stringent policies and practices relating to the collection, use, and sharing of that data. Best practices should include privacy impact assessments and consider the scope for “privacy by design” methodologies.

As the rhetoric around Aadhaar makes clear, the promise of a quick technical solution to intractable social problems is alive and well. However, it is time to recognize that human development involves the protection of civil liberties and individual freedoms, and not blindly rush into the creation of surveillance states in the name of development and poverty alleviation. Donors and aid organizations need to remember that the other 5 billion deserve privacy, too.

Read mor where –  http://belowpovertyline.com/privacy-for-the-other-5-billion/

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Aadhaar-enabled DBT is more demanding than DBT #UID

 Reetika Khera
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Interview with associate professor, humanities and social sciences department, IIT Delhi

Manavi Kapur  |  <>New Delhi 

 Last Updated at 21:11 IST

The future of the Aadhaar scheme is uncertain under the new Bharatiya Janata Party-led government at the Centre.Reetika Khera, an economist and associate professor in the humanities and social sciences department at Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, spoke to Manavi Kapur about the fate of Aadhaar and the possible alternatives to it.

Was Aadhaar necessary for the transfer of welfare benefits?

The public debate has routinely confused different ideas — Aadhaar, biometrics, cash transfers and direct benefit transfers (DBT). A recent study (by Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar) found that biometric smartcards  improve efficiency of payments, but the media reported it as a success of Aadhaar!

Aadhaar (or UID), is the unique number generated by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Cash transfers refer to the form  of the transfer – that is cash as opposed to in kind. Think of the public distribution system – the government can either provide subsidised food (an “in-kind” transfer) or it can give cash so people can buy the food themselves (a “cash” transfer). Cash transfer programmes include government schemes such as old age pensions, maternity entitlements and so on, which are very welcome.

On DBT, there is more confusion. For some (like me), DBT is just another word for electronic bank transfers – payments through accounts linked to CORE banking (which is the norm for us). For others, DBT is actually “Aadhaar-enabled DBTs” –electronic transfers plus linking (or “seeding”) bank accounts and databases of welfare beneficiaries using the Aadhaar. For yet others, DBT is the new proposed design for transferring subsidies: the subsidy (on, say, kerosene) is credited into your account and kerosene is bought and sold at the market price.

I think of DBT as electronic payments. This move is mostly very welcome as it provides a huge safeguard against corruption. The only drawback is that access to banks and post offices linked to CORE banking is still quite thin in rural areas.

What are the loopholes in the Aadhar card and UID number system, both as an identification mechanism and as a tool for distributing welfare schemes, in its present form?
The main problem is that the benefits of using UID for welfare schemes were always exaggerated. For instance, the National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme  was premised on the belief that wages are paid in cash (which is prone to corruption). In fact, since 2009, payments are routed through bank and post office accounts.  Wage payments through banks with CORE-banking provide as good a safeguard against corruption as Aadhaar can. Post office payments remain vulnerable to corruption and the solution lies in modernising post offices, for example providing CORE banking.

Where did Aadhaar fail in DBT that the government wants it removed? Why would it have not worked? Is it merely politics driving this decision?

For DBT you need all beneficiaries to have a core banking account. That is where the focus should be — expanding the modern banking sector, especially core banking in rural areas. DBTs do not need Aadhaar.

What the government had in mind when it spoke of DBT is actually “Aadhaar-enabled DBT” to transfer cash or subsidy. That requires three things: a modern banking sector to which beneficiaries have access; Aadhaar number for all beneficiaries; and seeding bank accounts with Aadhaar. Only when all three are in place, can Aadhaar-enabled DBTs proceed. Eight months after DBT was launched, 56 per cent of beneficiaries had a bank account; 25 per cent had an account and Aadhaar; but only 9.6 per cent had all three. This caused havoc — it made Aadhaar compulsory for cash transfers, leading to exclusion on a massive scale. For example, many elderly people stopped getting their pension in Jharkhand. Other Aadhaar pilots have also failed — NREGA payments (in Jharkhand) and LPG subsidy transfers (Karnataka).

Aadhaar-enabled DBT is a more demanding system than DBT, without any added benefits. From the point of view of DBT, the removal of Aadhaar is a welcome step. But if Aadhaar is going to be replaced by a more sinister project, the debate is far from over.

The data already collected will be vulnerable to misuse. What are the ethical and logistical challenges in collection and storage of such private biological parameters?

There are numerous counts on which objections have been raised against the Aadhaar project — civil liberties, data security, data mining, privacy, lack of any legal safeguards and so on. Important among them is the creation of a centralised database of residents that could/would potentially be linked to other databases, such as those created by “security agencies”. In this sense, UID andNational Population Register (NPR) create an infrastructure that can be misused.

Let me give one example of the legal vacuum in which this project is operating. Hearing a petition against UID, the Supreme Court learnt that there is no law, no contract; further, biometrics (fingerprints, iris scans) are classified as “sensitive information” by the rules framed under the IT Act 2000 and these cannot be handed around.

What are the other repercussions of scrapping the Aadhaar scheme?
The scrapping of Aadhaar, if it happens, is bound to raise questions of the expense incurred on it. There are at least two ways to look at this. One, UIDAI did work that would eventually have been done by the Census office for the NPR. Two, one cannot throw good money after bad money. To the extent that the UID project was a waste of money, it is better to cut our losses now than to pour more money into the project.

Can the existing Aadhaar be modified for bona fide use? If not, what is a possible alternative?

Aadhaar was clear that it was for all residents. NPR, however, is based on citizenship. That is the real danger of merging Aadhaar with NPR. It will become an exercise in harassing poor people. If registration in NPR is made compulsory, and people are required to prove their citizenship, it will formally create a category of “second class” citizens. It is not difficult to guess who will fall into that category.

Read mor ehere – http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/aadhaar-enabled-dbt-is-more-demanding-than-dbt-reetika-khera-114062800476_1.html

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